Res judicata is a quasi-universal principle, present in every modern European legal system. Although it is understood in very different ways in Civil Law and Common Law traditions, it plays a remarkably similar role in both. This is notably due to the fact that res judicata is based on overarching aims present in all procedural legal systems: the public interest in ensuring the finality of litigation and the authority of courts, and the protection of litigants' rights. It is necessary to take into account both objectives in order to understand the doctrine of res judicata. These aims sometimes conflict and each legal system attempts to reconcile them within its specific rules concerning res judicata. A comparative analysis based on English, French, Italian, Spanish and European Union law shows how the choices made in each system express a balancing act between them.
A. INTRODUCTION
Procedural law is presented either as the set of rules by which individual parties rely on the justice system in order to defend their private interests, or as the means by which the justice system seeks to regulate itself to ensure the proper administration of justice or to achieve other aims related to the common good. In truth, these two conflicting aims influence procedural law and it is often the balancing of these rules that determines the specific rules applicable in any given case. Res judicata is one of the best examples of this balancing exercise.
The term res judicata refers both to a matter already adjudicated and to the rule that prevents the same issue from being raised in later proceedings between the same parties.
1 It operates as a quasi-rule of evidence in every legal system. This contribution, through a comparison between English, French, Italian, Spanish and European Union law, aims to explain how the rules relating to res judicata seek to reconcile competing interests. Without providing a comprehensive comparative study, we will seek to show the similarity of the competing policy objectives that underpin the rules concerning res judicata.
In Civil Law traditions, under the influence of a faulty translation from the Latin Digest, 2 res judicata was long characterised as a presumption of truth attached to judgments.
* Araceli Turmo is Senior Lecturer at the Université de Nantes, Laboratoire DCS. 1 In English law, the rule is generally referred to as the 'doctrine of res judicata' in contrast to 'a res judicata', which is a specific judicial decision. 2 Giovanni Pugliese, 'Res iudicata pro veritate accipitur,' (1967) 1-2 Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile 503, 510-12.
legal system as a whole in ensuring the finality of litigation. The second shows a different goal, that of protecting each party's rights through preventing further litigation on issues that have already been decided upon by a court.
The goals attributed to res judicata in these maxims may be linked to the principle of legal certainty, on the one hand, and to the principle of effective judicial protection on the other. These principles are present in a variety of forms in every modern legal system as they express concerns central to judicial institutions' very raison d'être. Legal communities within the European Union and its Member States generally perceive res judicata as being concerned with legal certainty and the good functioning of legal and judicial systems.
However, a more balanced approach can be found in Common Law systems and in Spanish Constitutional Law, which also view res judicata as a tool that protects the subjective rights of the parties.
A theoretical analysis of the foundations of res judicata must therefore simultaneously rely upon aims relating to the general functioning of the legal system and the subjective rights of the parties. Although these aims coexist and can both serve as justifications for the doctrine of res judicata, they are often presented as being in conflict and leading to opposite solutions in specific cases. The rules deriving from res judicata can therefore be understood as the results of conciliation between these conflicting aims.
B. RES JUDICATA AS AN EXPRESSION OF CONFLICTING AIMS
Res judicata is a perfect example of the way in which procedural law seeks to respond to two very different, if not irreconcilable, objectives. The first is to ensure the stability of legal relations recognized or established by the courts, and thus the authority of the judicial system as a whole. This makes it possible for parties to trust the courts and the legal system. The rule of law relies upon the ability of the legal system to provide final rulings on the conflicts that arise within a society. Otherwise the state would be unable to comply with one of its most basic functions as described in social contract theory. Confidence in the court's ability to ensure compliance with the law and with its own rulings is therefore one of the main objectives of any procedural law.
The second objective concerns the protection of the subjective rights of individuals who resort to litigation in order to resolve disputes. Procedural rules should be set up so as to allow parties to make their positions heard during judicial proceedings, and to ensure that they comply with the resulting decision. Here, too, the ability to ensure that the court's decision is final plays an essential part since it allows the parties to protect their rights. Both aims must be taken into account -procedural law as a whole, and the doctrine of res judicata in particular.
Res judicata as a requirement derived from the public interest
The prevailing view in Civil Law systems is that res judicata primarily serves the interests of the legal system as a whole. Pro utilitate publica rebus judicata stare conveniat; 10 public utility requires us to abide by what has been judged. The social need for final decisions to be made by courts in order to resolve conflicts is notably expressed by the principle of legal certainty. This requirement may also be linked to the concepts of judicial economy, or the proper administration of justice; they all require litigation to lead to a final decision for reasons related to the adequate functioning of the legal system. No legal system can function without the irreversibility of judicial decisions. Without it, the authority of courts would be undermined; they would not be able to render final judgments and would therefore be unable to fulfil their role in ensuring the stability of legal relations.
The same view may be found in the Common Law tradition, in which the phrase quia interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium 11 is often used in judgments concerning res judicata.
The adversarial nature of the Common Law system generally means that res judicata is characterized as an estoppel, making it a tool that allows each party to defend its own interests. But the courts are also well aware that this doctrine, perhaps chiefly, serves a more general purpose within the legal system. Lord Wilberforce wrote in 1977:
English law, and it is safe to say, all comparable legal systems, places high in the category of essential principles that which requires that limits be placed on the rights of citizens to […] domestic procedural rules which […] restrict the possibility of applying for annulment of a subsequent arbitration award proceeding upon an interim arbitration award which is in the nature of a final award, because it has become res judicata, are justified by the basic principles of the national judicial system, such as the principle of legal certainty and acceptance of res judicata, which is an expression of that principle.
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The Eco Swiss Case is one of the best examples of restriction of national procedural autonomy by the ECJ. According to this case, any national court that receives an application for the annulment of an arbitration award must grant that application if the agreement is contrary to Article 81 EC (now 101 TFEU), 18 and where its domestic rules of procedure require it to grant an application for annulment founded on national rules of public policy.
However, where domestic rules preclude the re-examination of a final arbitration award which has acquired the force of res judicata, EU law does not require national courts to examine whether the agreement upheld by the award was, in fact, contrary to Article 81 EC.
14 The issue of whether legal certainty may also be considered a right and not only an overriding principle guiding legal institutions is beyond the scope of this paper. EU law certainly offers a number of examples of fundamental rights being explicitly linked by the Courts to the general principle of legal certainty, see can never be fully ensured means that it must be used as a constant reference point, a standard which procedural law must seek to respect but within the bounds of possibility. With regard to res judicata, this means that legal certainty serves both as its theoretical and legal justification, and as a general goal that comes into play whenever the courts or the legislature consider specific rules granting varying degrees of protection to the finality of judgments.
This goal is not exclusive, however, and other concerns influence these decisions.
The same goes for judicial economy or the proper administration of justice, which are less often formulated in terms of enforceable general principles and instead derived from legal certainty. 23 There can be no doubt that one of the roles of res judicata is to ensure justice is adequately administered and organized. 24 By preventing parties from indefinitely raising the same issues, it plays a major part in ensuring that courts are not stalled by lengthy Here, too, the general standard is seen as one of the aims of the rules relating to res judicata, but it cannot -and should not -be the only guiding principle. A different approach might lead judges and lawmakers to distort res judicata. 28 Legal certainty and the proper administration of justice must therefore not be seen as the only justifications or foundations for the rule of res judicata. 
Res judicata as a doctrine derived from fundamental rights
The doctrines of legal certainty and judicial economy tend to lead the courts to expand the scope of res judicata, thus preventing a greater amount of issues from being re-litigated.
However, other policies tend to justify the opposite approach. These other policies are linked to the subjective understanding of res judicata, which as a rule must take into account the rights of the parties. Res judicata serves the public interest but it also serves the rights of parties who have a vested interest in the finality of litigation. In terms of legal principles, concerns obviously appear in the characterization of ne bis in idem as a fundamental right, but they are also expressed as a more general right to a fair trial or effective judicial protection. It is imperative to understand such fundamental rights not as principles that prevent the proper application of res judicata, but instead as its foundations.
Ne bis in idem has long been recognized as a fundamental right in Article 4 of Protocol 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 29 and, more recently, in
Article 50 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Although it is sometimes considered to be an expression of res judicata in criminal law, and the European and national legal systems do not all draw this distinction along identical lines, the consensus seems to be that they constitute two separate legal norms. 30 Ne bis in idem aims to prevent a double trial but also a double punishment, and is clearly more focused on the protection of human rights than res judicata, whose primary purpose is to prevent courts from making two separate and incompatible rulings on the same issue.
However, it seems impossible to characterize ne bis in idem as a fundamental right and not also take into account the impact of res judicata on the protection of individual rights. Both norms appear to derive from the same combination of aims related to the public interest and legal certainty, and more subjective aims expressed through fundamental rights.
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The proximity between them certainly must be taken into account when making the case for the subjective foundations of res judicata.
The 'subjective' approach to res judicata is very familiar to lawyers trained in This perspective also explains why, instead of only characterizing res judicata as a rule of public interest, Common Law courts tend to think of it as an estoppel, ie a rule that prevents a party from making assertions contrary to what has previously been established. In the words of the High Court of Australia, the doctrines related to res judicata 'prevent a party to a proceeding raising, in a new proceeding against a party to the original proceeding, a cause of action or issue that was finally decided in the original proceeding'.
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Thinking of res judicata as a form of estoppel is a very specific trait of Common Law systems. However, the fact that it is also treated as a quasi-rule of evidence in the Civil Law traditions shows that although its foundations may be perceived as related to the public interest, it functions as a tool placed at the disposal of the parties. The premise always seems to be that each party has a vested interest in the finality of litigation, and that defence of their own interests will be enough to ensure res judicata is respected. One legal system is known for attributing a constitutional foundation to res judicata. 35 Article 24.1 of the Spanish Constitution: 1. Todas las personas tienen derecho a obtener la tutela efectiva de los jueces y tribunales en el ejercicio de sus derechos e intereses legítimos, sin que, en ningún caso, pueda producirse indefensión. 2. Asimismo, todos tienen derecho al Juez ordinario predeterminado por la ley, a la defensa y a la asistencia de letrado, a ser informados de la acusación formulada contra ellos, a un proceso público sin dilaciones indebidas y con todas las garantías, a utilizar los medios de prueba pertinentes para su defensa, a no declarar contra sí mismos, a no confesarse culpables y a la presunción de inocencia. litigants must be able to rely upon these answers. A judgment provides the parties with rights to a particular kind of protection within the legal system. Res judicata must therefore be perceived through the rights of the parties, and not just as a tool serving the public interest through judicial economy, or a general goal of stability of the legal system.
Characterizing effective judicial protection as a foundation of res judicata can be useful. It provides courts and parties with a standard by which to evaluate specific rules applicable to claims based on res judicata. The issue of extension of the scope of res judicata to cover elements not previously debated before the court illustrates the importance of the 'subjective' approach. In many legal systems, res judicata is extended to cover the elements that should have been brought up during the trial, even if they were not. However, an excessive extension will lead to a violation of the right to effective judicial protection. If res judicata also covers elements of a ruling such as obiter dicta, which the court has not given the parties a chance to discuss, the adversarial principle mandating that both parties must be heard will have been violated. Therefore, in EU law, the right to effective judicial protection prevents the inclusion of such issues within the scope of res judicata.
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Conceiving of res judicata as emanating, inter alia, from the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, and taking into account its links with ne bis in idem, contributes to a more complete understanding of res judicata. This is not only useful in a theoretical study of procedural rules ensuring compliance with judicial decisions, but it is also crucial to understanding specific rules and decisions made by the courts, which are influenced by the need for legal certainty and finality, and by fundamental rights.
C. RES JUDICATA AS A BALANCING ACT BETWEEN CONFLICTING AIMS
The coexistence of public interest and fundamental rights in the foundations of res judicata not only justifies the existence of the doctrine in any legal system, but also has a tangible impact on the rules created to ensure its effectiveness. These principles, when applied to the precise questions arising from res judicata, do not necessarily lead to the same answers. The protection of the rights of the successful plaintiff and the public interest related to the stability of the legal system will lead to the same preoccupation with the finality of litigation.
However, this subjective approach is not sufficient to explain the rules that force parties to consolidate their claims in a single trial. Moreover, in some cases, litigants' right to effective 44 judicial protection goes directly against the public interest goals expressed through res judicata. Where res judicata prevents new elements from being presented to the courts, the goal of stability can sometimes prevent a complete protection of the litigants' rights. In contrast, emphasizing the requirement of effective judicial protection will lead courts to restrict the reach of rules in order to provide stability. Where there is a conflict between the two general aims of res judicata, the precise rule applied in each case will depend on the balance struck by each legal system.
The Common Law's estoppel and the Civil Law's objection of inadmissibility, both of which give effect to res judicata, rely on other rules regarding its scope. Which parts of the ruling should be considered irreversible; how should the criterion of similarity between the previous ruling and the current suit be interpreted; can objections based on res judicata be raised in suits involving different parties; in which cases should there be an exception to res judicata? These issues are all determined by balancing the aims of stability and legal certainty, on the one hand, and the effective judicial protection of the litigant on the other.
The remainder of this paper will examine the impact of this normative balancing act on both the material and personal scope of res judicata, and the exceptions to the rule.
The impact of the balancing act on the material scope of res judicata
The question of scope gives rise to some of the most problematic issues arising out of res judicata. This doctrine forces parties and courts to comply with what has already been determined in a previous decision. Initially this general rule seems simple, but it cannot be applied without a number of precise criteria that determine the similarity between the case at hand and the previous case, and which parts of the previous ruling are to be considered part of res judicata. The choices made regarding these criteria are direct results of balancing the conflicting interests.
The material scope of res judicata is determined by the similarities between the issues that were decided in the previous ruling, and those disputed in the current suit. The basic rule is that res judicata applies inter easdem personas eadem quaestio, 45 ie between the same parties and on the same issue. Thus, the way in which the subject matter of the claim is defined, and the manner in which the identity of the parties is determined, are essential to the application of the rules derived from res judicata.
Most legal systems make a distinction between subject matter and cause of action with regard to the material similarities between the previous judgment and the current case. 45 Charles Demangeat, Cours élémentaire de droit romain, (Marescq aîné 1866) 680.
Here, subject matter may be understood as the factual basis for the suit, the situation that gave rise to the previous case, and to the final judgment being invoked. In most systems, subject matter is traditionally defined according to the facts and their legal characterization. Cause of action refers more specifically to the legal basis for the suit, ie legal reasoning based on the facts that support the party's claim, as well as the remedy it seeks. The distinction between cause of action and subject matter appears in French law, which refers to identity in 'cause'
and 'object' respectively, 46 and has, once again, influenced European Union law. 47 Italian law does not seem to rely on such a neat distinction between factual subject matter and cause of action, although both concepts do appear. 48 The distinction itself has, at any rate, been the source of heated debate, especially among French authors.
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Common Law terminology does not lend itself to such a characterization.
Nevertheless, while the cause of action is at the heart of a specific estoppel-based claim, an In all of these cases, criticisms arise from the notion that the rights of litigants, particularly the right to effective judicial protection, are being infringed. However it is hoped that, by encouraging the parties to concentrate a litigious matter in a single case, litigation can be better managed and the courts' caseload reduced. Res judicata does not in itself require the courts to define subject matter or identity between subject matters in a more or less restrictive manner. These choices are made according to a balance between broader principles and concerns that influence the rules governing res judicata.
The impact of the balancing act on the personal scope of res judicata
The similarity between the case at hand and the one invoked as res judicata relies upon two major criteria: the parties and the subject matter. The identity of the parties involved in both suits does not usually present a problem. According to some sources, the effects of res judicata extend to the parties' privies. 56 The limitation of the effects of res judicata is clearly linked to a concern of fairness to third parties, whose access to justice would be thwarted if 53 Cass., Ass. plén., 7 the only requirement were stability. 57 There are however a number of exceptions to the privity rule, which can only be explained by the goal of ensuring legal certainty.
The general rule dates back to Roman law and the maxim res inter alios judicata aliis neque nocet neque prodest; simply put, what has been judged cannot harm or benefit others.
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It is common to all legal systems, an indication of the influence of Roman law and of a general concern for fairness and access to justice. Allowing res judicata to take effect among non-parties will prevent them from presenting their claims before the courts, since they did not have the chance to do so in the previous suit. 59 This rule according to which res judicata only takes effect inter partes appears in Article 1351 of the French Civil Code, and similarly in all Civil Law traditions. 60 It also applies in English law, in both cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel.
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The privity rule is contrary to the general aim of stability and legal certainty.
Allowing a non-party to call into question issues on which a final judgment has already been made could lead to complicated legal situations. However, insofar as the right to effective judicial protection must also be taken into account, preventing non-parties from arguing their case before the courts seems to cause greater harm than the possible problems that might result from allowing several suits to arise between different parties from a single factual situation. This is a typical balancing act between conflicting interests within a legal system.
The existence of such a balancing act appears even more clearly in the erga omnes effects of res judicata in cases where a ruling declares an act void. law. 65 The effect of rulings that lead to the annulment of a legal act, or one of its provisions,
is that any such ruling benefits from 'absolue' or erga omnes res judicata, and thus extends beyond the initial parties. Such a judgment can constitute sufficient grounds for inadmissibility even in cases involving third parties.
The justification for this extended res judicata is simple. The act or provision cannot be void or voided, and be still applicable in a different case. All members of the legal system must comply with the court's finding, otherwise the effectiveness of judicial review would be undermined if its effects were limited to the parties to the initial suit. 66 If an act is void, it can never again be relied upon before the courts. Absolute res judicata must be understood as one of the ways in which the legal order protects the first court's findings. It nevertheless clearly goes against the maxim res inter alios judicata aliis neque nocet neque prodest. In French law, the traditional justification for the exception to the inter partes scope of res judicata is the supposedly objective nature of judicial review. The aim of the suit is not supposed to be the defence of the claimant's rights, but that of legality. 67 When exercising the power of judicial review, courts are in search of an objective truth as to the validity of the legal norm.
Although the reality of this distinction between 'objective' and 'subjective' litigation has been questioned in recent years, 68 it provides a theoretical basis for the specific, 'absolute' res judicata granted in rulings where courts find an administrative or legislative act void in certain legal systems. The justification for this clearly lies in the same effort to reconcile legal certainty and effective judicial protection, as that which warrants the general rule. Here, the balance shifts in favour of legal certainty because there is a greater public interest in the stability of rulings concerning the validity of administrative and legislative acts than in that of rulings that only deal with private interests.
The specific balance struck between the need to provide access to effective judicial protection, and the aim of ensuring legal certainty within the legal system, thus plays a major role in establishing the personal scope of res judicata. This scope can vary within a single legal system according to the balance deemed appropriate for the specific contents of judicial decisions.
The impact of the balancing act on the exceptions to res judicata
The reconciliation of legal certainty and judicial economy, and the right to effective judicial protection, is also manifest in the exceptions to the general rule of res judicata. The extension of the personal scope of res judicata may itself be considered an exception. However, more problematic consequences arise from the exceptions that lead to a limitation of the scope or effects of res judicata. These are rare occurrences due to the essential contribution of res judicata to the proper functioning of any modern judicial system. Legal systems, however, do provide exceptions. Furthermore, the inclusion of national courts in the European judicial system, which was required to ensure the effectiveness of EU law, has created another type of exception to the application of domestic rules concerning res judicata. All these exceptions have one criterion in common: res judicata does not apply where its application would lead to a serious encroachment on the litigants' rights.
Exceptions to the normal application of res judicata are clearly based on the idea that justice was not served during the first suit. At least one of the party's rights was violated, and the need to provide effective judicial protection justifies re-litigating the same matter. In English law, although the bar on re-litigation resulting from cause of action estoppel is deemed absolute, exceptions exist in cases of fraud or collusion. 69 The discovery of new material does not permit the reopening of the case where that rule applies, however it does constitute an exception to issue estoppel. 70 Although its precise reach has been widely discussed, its description by Lord Sumption in Virgin Atlantic illustrates the policy aims behind this exception: issue estoppel bars the raising of certain points in subsequent proceedings 'except in special circumstances where this would cause injustice'.
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The same concerns justify revision and third party proceedings. Contrary to appeal, which may only be filed before the judicial decision is final, both of these proceedings are generally subject to much broader time limits. Revision is the clearest exception to the maxim which supports the irreversibility of final judgments, res judicata pro veritate habetur.
Instead of the fiction of truth, here the search for actual truth prevails. Faced with facts which, had they been known to the trial court and the parties, would have led to a different decision, courts must allow the case to be reopened in order to reach a decision based on a This exception's very existence is an illustration of the search for balance between stability, and the goals of effective judicial protection and fairness. In cases where litigants were genuinely unaware of the facts that proved decisive, revising an earlier ruling appears necessary in order to adequately protect their rights. However, the need to ensure the stability of the legal system remains a major concern, which translates into very strict admissibility criteria. For instance, in EU law, revision proceedings may only be introduced when a fact has been discovered, the fact is a decisive factor for the ruling to be made, and the fact was unknown to the court and to the party claiming the revision when the case was decided. 75 To this day, no revision procedure has managed to pass the admissibility criteria applied by EU Courts. Even when the fact brought forward by the applicant is indeed new, the Courts hold that it would not have been a decisive factor in the initial decision. 76 The high standards applied in the admissibility test are direct consequences of the public interest issues at stake in any exception to res judicata. Only exceptional circumstances could justify revising a final judicial decision because this entails a serious encroachment on stability and legal certainty. The same may be said of the lesser exception created by third party proceedings, which allow a third party otherwise unable to take part in the initial proceedings to ask the courts to review a judgment prejudicial to it. 77 Although not introduced by the parties, these constitute an exception to res judicata insofar as their aim is to lead a court to revise its initial judgment. Here, too, the balance between judicial protection and stability largely determines legal standards. By way of example, EU Courts require third parties to have exercised a form of due diligence; for instance, they must be able to prove that a 'diligent litigant' would have had reason to think that the judgment in the initial proceedings would not encroach upon their rights. 78 Fairness and access to justice justify review of the initial judgment only where the violation of the third party's rights is such as to warrant jeopardizing the stability of the legal system. authorities to re-examine administrative acts covered by res judicata if they appear contrary to EU law, where such a procedure exists in domestic law. Although this rule does not apply when domestic law does not allow for such a revision, the heated debate that followed revolved mainly around the need to respect national rules protecting res judicata. 80 Similarly, the ECJ has ruled that when national courts consider, proprio motu, the compatibility of an arbitral award with public order, they also have an obligation to raise compatibility issues with rules of European public order, such as the prohibition of unfair terms in consumer contracts. 81 In these cases, EU law restricts the normal application of domestic rules concerning res judicata, although it only requires an expansion of exceptions that already exist. More significant restrictions arise from the case law dealing with the use of res judicata as a justification for violations of EU law, especially of state aid rules. In these cases, the ECJ has firmly stated that domestic rules prohibiting courts from calling into question a decision which was contrary to EU law must be set aside. 82 It has also required Member States to adjust long-standing rules concerning State liability for judicial decisions in order to comply with an EU legal principle that was introduced 83 notwithstanding States' objections that it went against national rules concerning res judicata. 84 In all these cases, EU law goes against the normal application of res judicata under national law in order to ensure its own effectiveness. This can be seen as an expression of a form of European public interest in the functioning of the EU legal system. However, the Court has often linked it to the protection of the rights that private parties derive from EU law. These rights indeed depend on the use of Member States' institutions as enforcers of EU rules, sometimes against their own domestic legal norms. In this sense, the adjustments required of domestic rules concerning res judicata are justified by the need to make sure that they do not prevent access to the proper enforcement of EU law, which is necessary in order to protect the rights of private parties.
The general policy debate at issue is apparent in the ECJ's reasoning itself. In these cases, the ECJ does not frame the debate in terms of exceptions to res judicata justified by the efficiency of EU law. Instead, it chooses to present the adjustments made to res judicata as justified by a specific balance between effectiveness and legal certainty as a legitimate principle within national legal systems. As these issues are essential to the proper functioning of the EU legal system, EU law must set the balance rather than Member States. Opposing two general principles, which express core values of any legal system, seems to be an attempt to alleviate concerns about interference with domestic res judicata rules. The debate is thus framed not in terms of encroachment upon national procedural autonomy, but of general policy orientations.
All of the exceptions to general rules protecting res judicata are justified by a shift in the balance between legal certainty and the protection of individual rights. Once again, these policy concerns appear quite clearly -although not always explicitly -in the grounds for these procedural rules, whether they form an integral part of a system's procedural law or answer the specific needs created by the European Union's judicial system.
D. CONCLUSION
Public interest concerns and fundamental rights both contribute to the legal foundations for res judicata. They serve as justifications for the general rule that litigation should lead to final decisions, and often they both lead to the same answer on a specific question. However, they can also constitute opposing forces that influence the rules and solutions chosen by lawmakers and judges who determine how res judicata should be applied. This overview of select European legal systems illustrates the way in which procedural law is created through a constant search for balance between the competing goals of efficiency and stability on the one hand, and proper access to justice and fairness on the other. Although this search leads to different results in every time period and legal system, the decisive aims remain the same.
The universality of these policy issues also explains why, despite having been constructed
